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464 Abstract
Inheritance fundamentally violates the meritocratic justice principle of society. 
Despite the high level of wealth concentration and the fact that few people would be 
affected, political support for an inheritance tax is rather low. The topic of inheritance 
is not only about wealth but about values. We combine both by using questions in the 
Austrian Household Finance and Consumption Survey tailored to examine family val-
ues. The main aim of the paper is to bring sociological concepts and perceptions into 
the economic analysis of the role of inheritance in wealth distribution. We find several 
inconsistencies in people’s perceptions concerning the relation of inheritance to issues 
of social justice. We argue that family values are decisive for negative perceptions of 
inheritance taxation. Our empirical evidence suggests that in order to understand the 
resistance to inheritance taxation in society better, family values have to be taken into 
account. The main aim of the paper is to deliver empirical evidence for bringing an 
interdisciplinary approach, including sociological concepts, into economic analysis 
when analysing the relationship between inheritance, wealth and taxation.
Keywords: inheritance tax, wealth distribution, Austrian Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey, Austria
1 INTRODUCTION
Most people do not question the practices of making and receiving bequests and 
inheritances. It seems to be natural that people should be able to dispose of their 
property by will. But still, inheritance taxation remains an ongoing issue attended 
by impassioned controversies (Beckert, 2004). Even though it is easy to justify an 
inheritance tax from a meritocratic point of view, it is a highly unpopular tax 
(Beckert, 2004; 2007).
In this paper we intend to contribute to a better understanding of this inheritance 
taxation puzzle. To do so, we explore perceptions on inheritance taxation in Aus-
tria based on the Austrian Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) 
and combine them with conceptual considerations.
The economic well-being of a household is influenced by private resources such 
as labour income, capital income and/or accumulated wealth. The family adds to 
that by bequests, gifts and non-monetary support. Finally, public welfare organ-
ized by the state contributes to the economic well-being of households. Inherit-
ance has far reaching economic consequences for wealth accumulation (Arrondell 
and Masson, 2013). An increasing number of individuals receive inheritances, 
which  account for a growing share in total wealth. Furthermore, these wealth 
transfers are heavily concentrated at the top of the distribution (see Piketty, 2014). 
The German sociologist Jens Beckert (2013) distinguishes four different princi-
ples used in public debates to question intergenerational wealth transfers or to 
legitimize inheritance taxation: the family principle, the equality of opportunity 
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465The family principle claims that wealth of the testator is the property of the family and 
not of the individual. The equality of opportunity principles states that inequality is 
only justified on the foundation of differing achievements. The social justice principle 
seeks to correct unequal outcomes. The community principle focuses on promoting 
the common good. Philanthropical foundations provide an example of this principle.
Based on arguments of fairness and/or economic incentives a policymaker could jus-
tify higher taxes on inherited assets than on wealth accumulated via earnings and sav-
ings. However, whether the practice of inheritance is unjust can be judged from two 
completely different perspectives. In the familial context it might be legitimate. Fam-
ily members take care of the needs and interests of one another. Giving gifts or inherit-
ing assets is then just an expression of this view. In the context of society, however, the 
principles of merit and of equality of opportunity may point in the opposite direction.
As early as during the French revolution, the inheritance law aimed to alter family 
structures and bring equality. The issue was one of gender equality. The property 
law before had favoured men over women. Women have traditionally inherited 
less than men. Following the French revolution primogenitur was abolished. The 
family was described as the cell of the nation. A common adage from France 
reads: toucher à l`heritage c’est comme toucher à la familie [touching/striking the 
inheritance is like touching/striking the family] (Arrondell and Masson, 2013).
A culturally dominant view of the family is that it is a private sphere separated 
from public, economic and political spheres. While in the latter spheres it is inter-
ests that are dominant, in the family the needs of loved ones should be decisive. 
Actions should be motivated by love and only to a lower extent follow considera-
tions based on moral or justice.
In the process of modernization, the structure of property changed in societies. In 
earlier societies the family owned the wealth jointly. It was not owned by single 
person. Therefore, when the father died no succession happened as the other 
members of the family still held the wealth. To speak of individual property del-
egitimized this way of passing wealth over generations. If we consider each fam-
ily member as an independent wealth holder this brings up questions of testamen-
tary freedom. Under testamentary freedom the wealth holder will decide on the 
posthumous disposition of the property. However, if we consider wealth as partly 
jointly owned by the family, restriction of testamentary freedom will clearly be 
entailed. Testamentary freedom is, then, curtailed by there being guaranteed 
shares for family members. This might run against the last will of the current 
wealth holder. But this lack of discretion strengthens the family unit.
In 1896 the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell (1896) distinguished the rights to 
bequeath and the rights to inherit. He argued (Wicksell, 1896: 111, quoted in Mur-
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466   From (the social) point of view the main thing to do would be to take energetic 
measures to prevent the unearned accumulation of riches (and with it mostly 
also their uneconomic use) which is now encouraged by law and custom.
 The only practical way to reach this goal appears to me to lie in the recognition 
that any right of inheritance, bequest or gift necessarily involves two parts. 
There is the right to give and the right to receive. These must strictly be distin-
guished and each treated on its own merit.
 To restrict the right to give more than is absolutely necessary even now often 
runs counter to our ideas of justice and equity and also may be seriously ques-
tioned on economic grounds.
 The right of inheritance taken in the second, and more proper, sense of the 
word as the unlimited right to receive must, if at all, be justified in quite differ-
ent terms. Unless I am much mistaken, it rests on a now obsolete conception 
of social and family relationships.
This distinction between the perspective of the giver and the receiver is decisive 
from a justice perspective. It takes into consideration the freedom of private property 
and the right of society to use taxes and rules to regulate the inheritances received.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical 
considerations with regard to class analyses and equality of opportunity. Section 3 
introduces the data. In section 4 we analyse empirically the link between social 
classes and inheritances well as ambivalences in perceptions. Section 5 concludes.
2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this section we want to briefly elaborate the theoretical background we use in 
this paper. Subsection 2.1 introduces the concepts of class analysis used mainly in 
sociology we deem important for dealing with the economic relationships between 
inheritance, wealth and taxation. Subsection 2.2 discusses the concepts of equality 
of opportunity in the context of inheritance as these are key to understanding the 
perceptions of the population with regard to inheritance and inheritance taxation.
2.1 CLASS ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF INHERITANCES
We believe that the study of social classes in economics will get more attention in 
the 21st century than it received in the second half of the 20th century. Historically 
Karl Marx understood capitalism as a system of social relations. His focus was on 
the production side. A class arises out of certain production relations. Thus, his 
emphasis was on property relations and the organization of the labour process.
Wright (2009) distinguished three forms of class analysis. First, in sociological 
stratification research classes are identified with attributes and material life condi-
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467which control is exerted over economic resources. Third, the Marxian approach 
focuses on mechanisms of exploitation.
To specify social classes sociology uses employment and occupation criteria. 
Wolff and Zacharias (2013) suggest rather a specification of capitalist households 
based on wealth thresholds. Fessler and Schürz (2020) argue that classes should 
be distinguished not only by the absolute wealth level but also by functions of 
wealth and the dominance of different sources of income. Renters mainly earn 
income from selling their labour. Owners additionally have some non-cash income 
by living in their own home (imputed rent) and capitalists own businesses or rent 
out real estate and therefore own capital as a means of production.
One question we ask is the following: does the very probability of receiving an 
inheritance create a common understanding of equality of opportunity?
In a class society the interests of one class are opposed to those of another class. 
But does a class share common values? We study the centrality of class in the field 
of inheritance. We assume that renters – as they inherit less than the two other 
classes – tend to be in favour of an inheritance tax.
However, the moral compass does not follow class frontiers (Schürz, 2019). We 
observe partly culturally shared perceptions and justice judgements in the HFCS 
data. Another related research question we pursue is the following: does the equal-
ity of opportunity principle provide a shared principle of justice?
A conception of justice compatible with capitalism and democracy is hard to find 
as Murphy and Nagel argue. Murphy and Nagel (2002:3) start their philosophical 
contribution “The myth of ownership” by stating: “In a capitalist economy, taxes 
are not just a method of payment for government and public services. They are 
also a the most important instrument by which the political system puts into prac-
tice a conception of economic or distributive justice”.
Inheritance taxes have lost a lot of popular support over the last decades. Distribu-
tive justice cannot be understood in terms of the equality of opportunity principle 
alone. The focus on responsibility and choice is rather complementary to justice 
considerations of the results.
Equal libertarianism “implies that, in the absence of other reasons to the contrary 
(a very large qualification), gratuitous receipts should be confiscated by the state 
and redistributed equally among all persons” (Murphy and Nagel, 2002:155) The 
approach of equal libertarianism is not shared by many people.
We show that despite a class structure of society along the lines of wealth inequal-
ity there is a missing common idea on inheritance taxation. Wealth inequality is a 
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468 concept in a highly complex environment is required. Perceptions of inequality 
and judgements about justice do not follow a social classification.
2.2 EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF INHERITANCES
The extent to which wealth is transferred from one generation to the next affects 
the principle of equal opportunity. The American philosopher John Rawls gives 
equality of opportunity an important place in his two principles of justice: Rawls 
(1971:302) defined what he called “fair equality of opportunity” as,
 those who are at the same level of talents and ability, and have the same will-
ingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their 
initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the income class into 
which they are born. In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal pros-
pects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed.
Rawls claims, that two children of equal ability should have an equal chance to 
develop their skills regardless of their social background. If a child inherits wealth 
from his parents while another one does not, this implies obviously an inequality 
in material circumstances.
Family is a central transmitter of advantages and disadvantages. „Even in a well-
ordered society that satisfies the two principles of justice, the family may be a 
barrier to equal chances between individuals” (Rawls, 1971:301). He continues 
“the principle of fair equality of opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out, 
at least as long as the institution of the family exists.”
Further prominent philosophers have dealt with this issue. The question of David 
Miller from the University of Oxford is: “is it possible for equality of opportunity 
and family to coexist” (Miller, 2013:116). He distinguishes two forms of equality 
of opportunity (ibid:118): a minimal version that does not take into consideration 
background factors of persons and a maximal version of equality of opportunity 
that reaches from education to talents. What causes of inequality we think are 
morally arbitrary? For Murphy and Nagel (2002:57) such clearly unacceptable 
sources of inequality are first a “deliberately imposed caste system”, but also a 
“hereditary class stratification”.
3 DATA
We use two waves (2014 and 2017) of the Austrian Household Finance and Con-
sumption Survey in which we introduced additional questions tailored to study the 
process of inheritance more deeply. This household survey is based on personal 
interviewing of a representative household sample.
In 2006, two years before the global financial and economic crisis unfolded, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) initiated the Household Finance and Consumption 
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469the ECB, the national central banks of the euro system and several national statis-
tical institutes. The HFCS collects harmonized household balance sheet data for 
the euro area. It is the only set of household-level data for the joint analysis of 
wealth, income and consumption. Moreover, the HFCS provides information on 
numerous socioeconomic variables and on perceptions1.
In this paper we use the HFCS Austria 2014 and the HFCS Austria 2017. Both 
waves are based on a stratified multistage clustered sample of Austrian households. 
The reason for using two waves of the HFCS is merely the availability of certain 
questions. All data are gathered by Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing. Unit 
non-response is dealt with by non-response weights which are based on information 
also gathered about all non-respondents. Additionally, design- and poststratification 
weights are calculated to end up with weights to represent the Austrian population 
of private households. Item non-response is dealt with by means of multiple imputa-
tion. We use an iterative Bayesian approach using chained equations where item non 
response is modelled in a joint framework. For each missing value 5 imputations are 
produced to take into account uncertainty of the imputation process. Rubin’s Rule is 
then applied to all calculations in this paper, which all take into account complex 
survey population weights as well as multiple imputations.
The 2014 wave comprises 2,997 observations (gross sample of 6,308) representing 
about 3.8 million households. The response rate was 50%. The 2017 wave com-
prises 3,072 observations (gross sample of 6,280). The response rate was 49.8%.2
4 INHERITANCE WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF CLASS ANALYSIS
Since 2008 there has been no inheritance tax in Austria. Before 2008 inheritances 
were progressively taxed depending on the relationship of the receiver of the 
inheritance to the donor of the inheritance. The categories were (1) married part-
ners/children, (2) grandchildren and grand-grandchildren, (3) parents, grandpar-
ents and siblings, (4) nieces, nephews, (5) all others. Tax rates increased from 2% 
to 60%. The level of the tax rate depended on several parameters: the absolute 
value and relationship category. The rate was then applied to the inherited sum 
above a certain threshold, which was also dependent on the relationship category 
itself. All in all, it strongly favoured inheritance within the close family.
As inheritance is an intergenerational matter and wealth is accumulated over (many) 
generations it is directly linked to class location. In section 4.1 we present empirical 
evidence on the relation of inheritances and net wealth (by age). In a second step we 
analyse inheritance through the lenses of social classes in section 4.2.
4.1 HEIRS VERSUS NON-HEIRS
Figure 1 shows that receiving bequests is not only a question of age using a binned 
scatter plot. Inheritances do not depend alone on the fact that people are getting 
1 See Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS).
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470 older and later all of them will receive some inheritance. At every age heirs have 
more net wealth than non-heirs. In particular, in the age group of 50 to 60 years 
the difference among both groups is substantial.
Figure 1





















20 40 60 80
Source: HFCS Austria 2017.
Perceptions and preferences are crucial for understanding individual economic 
behaviour. But perceptions do not necessarily depend on socioeconomic factors. 
Figure 2 shows answers to three HFCS-Austria questions on views and prefer-
ences of respondents related to wealth:
 –  Do you think that it is possible to start poor, work hard and become rich in 
Austria?
 –  Inheritance tax was abolished in Austria in 2008. Are you in favour of re-
introducing inheritance taxation in Austria?
 – Are you in favour of introducing a wealth tax?
The first question can be understood as a variant of the equality of opportunity prin-
ciple. About 43% think that it is possible to start poor and get rich through work. 
However, while this share is about 30% for households in the lowest wealth quintile 
it rises to almost 60% for households in the highest quintile (not shown). Most of the 
respondents (57%) do not believe that it is possible to start poor and become rich. In 
particular, experience teaches people that life is usually not a variant of the Ameri-
can Dream. But people with higher incomes believe twice as strongly in merito-
cratic principles. Implicitly they understand their own economic success as deserved 
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471say that one can become rich through work more often than those that have not 
inherited anything. Of all heirs, 47% believe in this understanding of the equality 
principle. Inheritances are wealth transfers without merit of the recipient. This indi-
cates that no rational pattern of merit is to be found in the judgements.
The second and the third question focus on the preferences related to taxation of 
wealth. We do not know anything about the likely reasons for their preferences. But 
about 46% of respondents are in favour of a wealth tax. While the share is above 50% 
in the lowest wealth quintile, acceptance decreases to below 45% in the 5th quintile 
(not shown). For Austria this is astonishing. The median of household net wealth is 
83,000 EUR. No political party in Austria has ever argued for a wealth tax with a 
threshold below 100,000 EUR since tax was abolished (the inheritance tax was abol-
ished in 2008; the general tax on net wealth was already abolished in 1993). Thus, a 
rational concern for having to pay a new tax cannot explain these preferences.
Only about 20% of the reference persons would support the re-introduction of an 
inheritance tax.3 Interestingly this result is rather stable across all wealth quintiles 
(not shown). The rank in the wealth distribution is not decisive for normative 
judgements on wealth taxes. Issues of justice are not a priority in perceiving 
wealth inequality (Schürz, 2019).
Figure 2
Attitudes towards getting rich and wealth taxation (in %)
0 10 20 30 40 50
In favor of wealth tax
In favor of inheritance tax
It is possible to get rich through work
All Heir Non-heir
Source: HFCS Austria 2017.
Figure 3 illustrates – again using a binned scatter plot – that the differences between 
heirs and non-heirs regarding their attitude towards getting rich through work is not 
present across different levels of income. While the share of individuals believing in 
the possibility of getting rich through work rises with income, those who have 
already inherited something show (on average) a much stronger acceptance of this 
idea even within similar income groups including the lower income groups.
3 We use the financially knowledgeable person – who answers all household level questions in the HFCS – 
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472 Figure 3 
Attitude toward getting rich through work across income by heirs and non-heirs




























Source: HFCS Austria 2017.
4.2 INHERITANCE AND CLASS
In a recent working paper, we emphasize the advantages of a relational class-based 
approach (see Fessler and Schürz, 2018b) when analysing wealth inequality. By 
distinguishing three classes our analysis sheds light on the social relationships 
underpinning wealth. The functions of wealth are very different for people at the 
bottom (who mainly save for precautionary reasons), in the middle (who mostly 
hold wealth for its use value, in the form of home ownership), and at the top (who 
hold business wealth) of the wealth distribution (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). We 
define renters, who do not generate substantial income from wealth, owners, who 
generate non-cash income in form of the imputed rent by owner occupation, and 
capitalists, who are owners who additionally generate cash income from wealth by 
renting out further real estate and/or directly owning a private business. We find that 
these classes align well with the distribution of wealth.
Figure 4 shows the class locations for social classes in Austria. But also, in the euro 
area as a whole and in every single euro area country this pattern emerges and rent-
ers are dominantly located in the bottom, owners in the middle and capitalists at the 
top of the wealth distribution. At the same time, the two points in the wealth distri-
bution where there are more owners than renters and - at a higher wealth level - 
more capitalists than owners vary considerably across countries. We argue that this 
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473Figure 4
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Renters Owners Capitalists
Source: HFCS Austria 2017.
Recent preliminary results for the UK suggest a different picture. They show the 
UK’s way to become a nation of homeowners (see Fessler and Schürz, 2020). 
The cohort of people that became homeowners in the 1980s is still living and will 
transfer their real wealth later. That is why the pattern differs a lot from countries 
in continental Europe and the owners stay dominant up to the very top of the 
wealth distribution.
Figure 5 shows the share of heirs across classes. In the class of capitalists, the 
share of heirs is more than three times as large as in the class of renters. More than 
70% of capitalists have already received an inheritance. This suggests that class 
persistence across generations might be closely related to inheritance. And obvi-
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474 Figure 5











Note: The overall share of heirs amounts to 37.9% of all households.
Source: HFCS Austria 2017.
But normative judgements do not follow class patterns and do not show a consist-
ent picture. As Figure 6 illustrates it is not the case that capitalists are less in 
favour of inheritance taxation despite their higher share of heirs than in the case of 
renters. And heirs in the group of owners of their main residence are more in 
favour of an inheritance tax than non-heirs in the same group.
Among the social groups the rates of those in favour of inheritance taxation look 
rather similar. Within the group of renters (the group with the lowest level of net 
wealth) a household that has already inherited wealth shows the strongest support 
of an inheritance tax.
While for the capitalists the experience of an inheritance goes along with lower 
support of the tax, for the renters in the lower part of the wealth distribution it is 
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In favor of inheritance tax
Non -heir Heir
Source: HFCS Austria 2017.
One reason for such differences could be different timings of inheritances for the 
three classes and related expectations about future inheritances. As one can see in 
Table 1 that is not the case. Capitalists are strong in the inheritance groups including 
those that still expect an inheritance. The same is true for owners. Renters who 
inherit are relatively stronger in the group of those that still expect an inheritance 
than in those that do not but still show the strongest support for the tax. With regard 
to capitalists it is the other way around, even though they show the least support for 
the tax. Generally, renters that have not received an inheritance form an over-pro-
portional share of the group that expects one (other than for owners and renters). 
Also, renters who expect an inheritance show stronger support for the tax than own-
ers who expect one. After having already received an inheritance and without 
expecting another one a utility maximizing behaviour would suggest being in favour 
of the tax, while having not received one yet but still expecting one should favour 
attitudes against a tax. Clearly these attitudes are not driven by such rational ideas.
Table 1
Inheritance received and inheritance expected across class (Austria)
Renters Owners Capitalists
No inheritance and none expected 0.63 0.33 0.04
No inheritance but expected 0.77 0.21 0.02
Inheritance and none expected 0.32 0.52 0.17
Inheritance and expected 0.43 0.42 0.15
Source: HFCS Austria 2014.
By showing the cumulative wealth distribution functions for the different classes 
by inheritance received, Figure 7 illustrates that across all wealth levels heirs have 
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476 Figure 7





















Renters without inherited wealth
Owners without inherited wealth
Capitalists without inherited wealth
Notes: (i) This graph shows the cumulative distribution functions of wealth as well as the CDFs 
of wealth without inherited wealth of renters, owners and capitalists in the euro area. Both are 
normalized with the overall median of net wealth. (ii) To produce wealth without inheritance, 
inherited main residences as well as the 3 largest other potential inheritances of the household 
were considered. To estimate a present value an average yearly nominal interest rate of 6% was 
used. We use this assumption because there are no time series of consumer price indices avail-
able for all countries that are long enough for the construction of meaningful real interest rates. 
However, they likely translate to real interest rates of 2 to 4%. The sum of present values of all 
inheritances was subtracted from net wealth to obtain wealth without inherited wealth.
Source: HFCS Austria 2014.
Especially for capitalists the impact on class location is very strong. Without 
inheritances more than about 20% (instead of approximately 10%) of the capital-
ists would show wealth levels below median wealth. For owners this figure is 
about 40% (instead of around 30%). For renters the effect on class location is 
marginal. So even though for a single renter household an inheritance might be 
substantial (given the low amounts of wealth they have), even relatively more 
important than for the typical capitalist household (relative to their high amounts 
of wealth), class location is not affected. In terms of relative class locations inher-
itances are rather important for capitalists and to a lesser degree for owners but 
rather irrelevant for the class of renters.
Despite all rational reasons which would lead to the expectation that individuals 
should be in favour of inheritance taxation a vast majority in the overall popula-
tion and even across all classes are against them.
Using locally weighted regressions to estimate shares across the income distribu-
tion, Figure 8 shows the sentiment of family values even among those persons in 
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477they are asked about preferred exemptions and a vast majority are in favour of 
family exemptions if an inheritance tax were reintroduced. This means that among 
the few who are in favour of a tax more than 80% (rather stable across the income 
distribution) want to have exemptions from the tax for families.
Figure 8
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Inheritance tax Family exemptions (conditional)
Source: HFCS Austria 2017.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The legal privilege permitted to the intergenerational transmission of property 
within families is rarely questioned. Differences in social background and related 
monetary advantages such as inheritances prove that not every member of society 
has a fair chance of earning a specific rank in the wealth distribution.
We have enriched the discussion of the justification of inheritance taxation by 
empirical evidence of perceptions and people’s normative judgements. As percep-
tions related to a taxation of inheritance remain ambivalent this leads us to the 
conclusion that justifications of inheritance themselves are ambiguous. Arguing in 
favour of a social justice principle or an equality of opportunity principle does not 
imply that the acceptance of societal concerns as being more important than fam-
ily values. In order to increase the acceptance of inheritance taxation in the public, 
family concerns must be dealt with explicitly. The value of the family runs a lot 
deeper than economic motives. And family values rank higher than justice judg-
ments. Our results demonstrate the necessity of further interdisciplinary research. 
The theoretical conclusion of these empirical results is that the institution of the 
family must be placed at the centre of a theory of social justice (Miller, 2013). 
Perceptions of the family - as a place to be preferred in society - block equality of 
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478 in a society and it is to be doubted whether family concerns and equality of oppor-
tunity can be reconciled.
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Great wealth, in particular that of firms, endows






Wealth can be transferred as a gift or by inheritance
Wealth can be used to obtain social status,
thereby helping to gain prestige in society
Wealth can generate interest income or a return on
investment; dividends, rents, leasing receipts or
distributed profits represent different types
of investment income
Real assets can be used directly
(e.g. household main residence)
If required, wealth can be used
for consumer spending
Source: Own illustration.
